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Balancing the Protection of Children Against the
Protection of Constitutional Rights: The Past,
Present and Future of Megan's Law
I. INTRODUCTION
During 2002, issues of child safety and protection came to the
forefront. Television news reports consistently opened their pro-
gramming with images of kidnapped children and seemed to infer
that this "new phenomena" had reached epidemic status.' These
reports made frequent references to other instances of child kid-
napping, particularly the well-known case of Megan Kanka.2
Megan was a seven year-old New Jersey girl who was kidnapped,
raped and murdered in 1994 by a convicted sex offender who lived
across the street from her home.3 "Megan's Law," as it became
commonly known, was quickly enacted, first in New Jersey and
later by the federal government, in an attempt to protect other
children from the acts of known sex offenders.4
During this same time period in 2002, Megan's Law was under
attack on several fronts.5 In late 2001, several challenges to the
constitutionality of Megan's Law arose and the United States Su-
preme Court has only recently decided to uphold Megan's Law in
two states, despite these challenges.6 This comment will examine
the past, present and possible future of Megan's Law legislation.
In doing so, it will address the origins of the law, its widespread
application and finally, its probable future in light of recent
events.
1. Susan Reinhart, Recent Events Prompt Talk With Daughter, ASHEVILLE CITIZEN-
TIMES, July 28, 2002, at lB. See also John Woolfolk, "Block Parents" Program Revisited,
August 7, 2002, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (observing that the spate of kidnappings was
causing anxiety among parents across the country).
2. Reinhart, supra note 1.
3. Mission Statement of the Megan Nicole Kanka Foundation, at
http://www.megannicolekanka foundation.org/mission.htm (last visited on March 11, 2003).
4. Court TV Casefiles: New Jersey v. Timmendequas (5/97), at
http://www.courttv.com/casefiles/ verdicts/kanka.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2003).
5. Associated Press, Supreme Court Debates Merits of Megan's Laws (November 14,
2002), available at http://www.fredomforum.org/templates/document.asp?/documented
=17253 (last visited January 10, 2003).
6. Martin A. Schwartz, Supreme Court Rejects Megan's Law Challenges, Key Issues
Remain, 229 N.Y.L.J. 3 (2003).
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II. THE ORIGINS OF MEGAN'S LAW
A. Megan's Story
On July 29, 1994, seven-year old Megan Kanka left her home in
Hamilton Township, New Jersey and never returned.7 Megan's
mother, Maureen Kanka, awoke from a nap sometime after 6:30
p.m. to discover that Megan was missing.' After searching the
neighborhood and speaking with several neighbors, Mrs. Kanka
contacted the local police for help in finding her lost child.9 Among
the neighbors first questioned by Mrs. Kanka, and later by the
Hamilton Township Police, was Jesse Timmendequas.' °
Timmendequas lived in a house located across the street and di-
agonal to the Kanka residence." He shared that house with two
other adult males, Brian Jenin and Joseph Cifelli.12 At the time
that Megan disappeared, the Kanka's and their neighbors were
unaware that Timmendequas shared something else in common
with his housemates - all three men were convicted sex offend-
13ers.
Following their arrival at the Kanka home, officers proceeded to
question neighbors, including Timmendequas, regarding Megan's
disappearance.' 4 The officers became suspicious when Timmende-
quas began to shake and perspire heavily while being interviewed,
and subsequently requested that he accompany them to the police
station, where they arrived at approximately 3:00 a.m.'5 After he
was read his Miranda rights, Timmendequas was repeatedly ques-
tioned about his involvement in Megan's disappearance, while he
7. State v. Timmendequas, 737 A.2d 55, 66 (N.J. 1999). It is believed that before her
encounter with Jesse Timmendequas, Megan was on her way to play at a friend's house,
which was located just down the street from her own home. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 66-67.
11. Id. at 66. During the course of the trial, testimony revealed that Timmendequas
had lured Megan into the home, specifically his bedroom, by promising to show her a
puppy. CNN Interactive, Repeat Sex Offender Guilty in "Megan's Law" Case (May 30,
1997), at http://www.cnn.com/US/9705/30/megan.kanka/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2003).
12. Court TV Casefiles, supra note 4. The house that the three men shared was owned
by Cifelli. Timmendequas, 737 A.2d at 66.
13. Court TV Casefiles, supra note 4. In fact, the three men allegedly met while resi-
dents of New Jersey's Avenel Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center for sexual offenders.
Id. Timmendequas had apparently been convicted in 1981 for an attack on a five-year old
child and the attempted sexual assault of a seven-year old. See CNN Interactive, supra
note 11.
14. Timmendequas, 737 A.2d at 67-68.
15. Id. at 67.
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continually alleged his innocence. 16  Finally, nearly twenty-four
hours after Maureen Kanka first realized her child was missing,
Timmendequas asked to speak with his roommate, Brian Jenin, to
whom he confessed the location of Megan's body. 7
Timmendequas accompanied police officers to a local park and
led them directly to where he had hidden the child's body. 8 The
medical examiner determined that Megan had been struck in the
head and face, raped and sodomized, and that the ultimate cause
of death was strangulation.19
B. State v. Timmendequas
On October 19, 1994, Jesse Timmendequas was charged with
knowing or purposeful murder, felony murder, first degree kid-
napping and first degree aggravated assault." Prior to trial, the
defense made a series of pre-trial motions, most notably a motion
to change venue, a motion to suppress evidence obtained during
the lawful search of Timmendequas' home and a motion to sup-
press statements made by Timmendequas to the police while he
was in custody.2 Although the court did not agree to change
venue, it ultimately ruled that a "foreign jury" would be empan-
elled from another county within the state.22 The court also dis-
missed the motion to suppress evidence and ruled that all of Tim-
mendequas' statements to police would be admissible."
16. Id. at 67-68. The officers who were questioning Timmendequas became increas-
ingly suspicious due to inconsistencies in his statements. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. Megan's body was found concealed from view in tall weeds. Id. See also Court
TV Casefiles, supra note 12.
19. Timmendequas, 737 A.2d at 69.
20. Id. at 64-65. A Notice of Aggravating Factors was subsequently filed on November
18, 1994. Id. The aggravating factors were that "the murder was committed to escape
detection, apprehension, trial, punishment or confinement for the aggravated sexual as-
sault and/or kidnapping of the victim ... [and] the murder was committed in the course of
the commission of an aggravated sexual assault and/or kidnapping of the victim .... " Id.
21. Id. at 65.
22. Id. On April 15, 1997, counsel for Timmendequas filed a motion for reconsideration
regarding the request for change of venue, however, the court once again denied the mo-
tion. Id. The motion was again renewed prior to trial, and was again denied. Id.
23. Id.
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1. The Guilt Phase
Timmendequas' trial began on May 5, 1997.4 The state pre-
sented a great deal of forensic evidence, some of it extremely
graphic in nature, which clearly linked Timmendequas to Megan's
murder.25 The prosecution also alleged that after raping Megan,
Timmendequas first used a black leather belt to strangle her and
then covered her head with a plastic bag to ensure that she was
dead before disposing of her body. 6
In addition to forensic and other evidence, one of the police offi-
cers who had been involved in questioning Timmendequas con-
cerning the crime testified that Timmendequas had indicated that
"he felt he had been slipping for a while, meaning getting those
feelings for little girls . . . for a couple of weeks or a couple of
months."27 Timmendequas did not testify or present witnesses
during the guilt phase of his trial." His defense was presented
through cross-examination and argument, and he was ultimately
found guilty by the jury on all counts. 29 At the time that the ver-
dict was announced, the jury had deliberated for less than five
hours. °
2. The Penalty Phase
During the penalty phase of the trial, Timmendequas presented
two witnesses who testified on his behalf as to "mitigating fac-
tors."'" The prosecution relied upon the evidence that had been
24. Timmendequas, 737 A.2d at 67-70. The guilt phase, which concluded on May 30,
1997, lasted 25 days. Id.
25. Id. The evidence used to convict Timmendequas included a rope with dried blood
on it, the waistband and a piece of fabric from Megan's pants, both of which were located in
a trash can outside of Timmendequas' home, as well as forensic evidence including a bite
mark left by Megan on Timmendequas' hand, blood stains on the belt used to strangle her,
fiber samples consistent with the carpeting in Timmendequas' bedroom, blood on his bed
sheets, and a pubic hair found on Megan's body. Id.
26. Id. at 69. The medical examiner concluded that the official cause of death was
"mechanical strangulation" by a leather belt and that the plastic bag used by Timmende-
quas "hastened," but did not cause, Megan's death. Id. When Megan's body was discov-
ered, the plastic bag was still in place, covering her head. Id. at 68.
27. Id. at 69 (internal quotations omitted).
28. Id. at 70.
29. Id. Despite the fact that Timmendequas' counsel failed to present evidence on his
behalf, the only allegation on appeal with regard to ineffective assistance of counsel related
to the failure by his counsel to determine whether the age of the victim would adversely
impact potential jurors ability to deliberate fairly. Id. at 99.
30. CNN Interactive, supra note 11.
31. Timmendequas, 737 A.2d at 70. The two witnesses, a forensic social worker and a
clinical and forensic psychologist, testified with regard to the abuse Timmendequas alleg-
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presented in the guilt phase of the trial, their cross-examination of
the defense witnesses, the victim impact statement read by
Megan's father, and the testimony of four rebuttal witnesses
which included a forensic psychologist and three police officers.32
The jury found that the aggravating factors outweighed the miti-
gating factors and sentenced Timmendequas to death.33
3. The Appeal
Timmendequas' conviction was appealed to the Supreme Court
of New Jersey as a matter of right.34 Among the numerous issues
raised on appeal, seemingly one of the most controversial centered
around the trial court's rejection of Timmendequas' motion to
change venue. Counsel for Timmendequas had sought to change
venue due to the extensive publicity that surrounded the case
prior to trial.35 In addition to the normal publicity surrounding a
crime of this type, the case also received national attention due to
the Kankas' pro-active work to establish legislation designed to
protect other children from sexual predators.36
In the motion to change venue, counsel specifically noted that
437 separate articles had appeared regarding the case in two
prominent local papers.37 Although the court acknowledged that
the publicity was significant, it rationalized keeping the trial in
Mercer County due to the decision to empanel a foreign jury and
also cited the fact that moving the trial to another county would
edly sustained as a child as well as his social, emotional and psychological problems. Id. at
70-74. New Jersey defines "mitigating factors" as "[a]ny other factor which is relevant to
the defendant's character or record or to the circumstances of the offense." N.J. STAT. §
2C:11-3c(5) (2002). Furthermore, a defendant "may offer, without regard to the rules gov-
erning the admission of evidence at criminal trials, reliable evidence relevant to any of the
mitigating factors." N.J. STAT. § 2C:11-3c(2)(b) (2002).
32. Id. at 71-72.
33. Id. at 73. See also Timmendequas, supra note 14 and accompanying text.
34. Id. at 64. See also N.J. Ct. R. 2:2-1(a)(3). The New Jersey Rules of Court provide
that "[a]ppeals may be taken to the Supreme Court from final judgments as of right...
directly from the trial courts in cases where the death penalty has been imposed and in
post-conviction proceedings in such cases. . . ." N.J. Ct. R. 2:2-1(a)(3) (2002).
35. Timmendequas, 737 A.2d at 73-75. Among the specific instances of publicity raised
on appeal were articles which referred to Timmendequas as "scum," a "predator," a "piece of
trash," an "animal," a "pervert," a "dirtball," a "sicko," a "monster," and a "bottom-feeder.""
Id. at 73.
36. Id. This legislation and the work of the Kankas' to ensure its passage is further
addressed in Section III of this comment, infra.
37. Id. The term "articles" as used in Timmendequas' motion was defined to include
"stories, columns, cartoons, advertisements and letters to the editor." Id. at 73 n.2.
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present an extreme hardship to Megan's parents. 8 While the Su-
preme Court "cautioned newspapers to refrain from the inflamma-
tory reporting demonstrated" by the two Trenton papers, it re-
fused to reverse on the basis of pre-trial publicity." Ultimately,
and despite several dissents by various justices, the New Jersey
Supreme Court affirmed Timmendequas' conviction for murder,
the related offenses and the death sentence imposed by the jury.4 °
III. THE ENACTMENT OF MEGAN'S LAW AND ITS APPLICATION
A. The Enactment of Megan's Law in New Jersey
Following Megan's brutal murder in 1994, Richard and Mau-
reen Kanka, along with their neighbors, were shocked and out-
raged to learn of Jesse Timmendequas' previous convictions for
sexual offenses against young children.4' In spite of their grief
over Megan's death, the Kanka's quickly began to campaign for
laws requiring notice to the surrounding community when a con-
victed sex offender moves into that community following release
from prison. 2 Within three months of Megan's tragic death, New
Jersey's governor, Christine Todd Whitman, signed such legisla-
tion into law.43
The rationale for New Jersey's Megan's Law, as it is popularly
known, is that sex offenders, particularly those who commit
"predatory acts against children," pose a danger of recidivism."
The statute requires that anyone who has been "convicted, adjudi-
38. Id. at 74-75. The jury was ultimately selected from Hunterdon County, and while
.concluding that there is a realistic likelihood of prejudice from pretrial publicity . .. the
court recognized the importance of protecting the victims' rights." Id. at 75 (internal quota-
tions omitted). In 1991, New Jersey voted to approve a Victim's Rights Amendment to the
New Jersey Constitution which provides that a victim, defined to include the nearest rela-
tive of the victim of a criminal homicide, "shall not be denied the right to be present at
public judicial proceedings.. .. " Id. at 75-76 n.5.
39. Id. at 77.
40. Timmendequas, 737 A.2d at 123.
41. Court TV Casefiles, supra note 12.
42. CNN Interactive, supra note 11.
43. Joseph F. Sullivan, Whitman Approves Stringent Restrictions on Sex Criminals,
N.Y. TIMES, November 1, 1994, at B1. Governor Whitman signed the bill on October 31,
1994, almost three months to the day after Megan's disappearance on July 29, 1994. Id.
Whitman later served as the Administrator of the United States Environmental Protection
Agency, a cabinet position under President George W. Bush, until her resignation on June
27, 2003. See CNN.com!Inside Politics, Text of Whitman letter of resignation, May 21, 2003,
at http'/www.cnn.com/2O03/ALLPOLITICS/05/21/whitman.letter/index.html (last visited
November 19, 2003).
44. N.J. STAT. § 2C:7-1a (2002). A "recidivist" is defined as "[a] habitual criminal; a
criminal repeater." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1269 (6th ed. 1990).
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cated delinquent or found not guilty by reason of insanity for
commission of a sex offense" must register with a state designated
agency. 5 Despite the fear of recidivism, the legislators provided
that a person registered as a sex offender could apply to the Supe-
rior Court of New Jersey to terminate their registration if they
could demonstrate that they had not committed an offense within
15 years of their conviction or release, whichever occurred later,
and if it was found to be unlikely that they would pose a threat to
the safety of others.4
Despite the popular misconception, New Jersey's law was not
the first of its kind, but, due to Megan's tragic story and the sub-
sequent trial of Jesse Timmendequas, it did generate the most
public attention. Prior to Megan's death, at least 25 other states
required convicted sex offenders to register with law enforcement
officials upon their release from prison.4 ' The factor that set New
Jersey's law apart from other states and made the law appear par-
ticularly stringent is the requirement of community notification
when a registered sex offender moves into or returns to a
neighborhood. 8 Prior to its enactment, a handful of states had
already struck down similar laws as unconstitutional due to the
community notification requirement.49
Although the rationale for Megan's Law is protection of children
from sex offenders and their likely recidivism, the impetus was
clearly Megan Kanka's tragic death. In testament to this fact, a
subsection of the statute specifically states that "[t]his act and the
system of registration and community notification .. . shall be
known and may be cited as 'Megan's Law."'5 °
45. N.J. STAT. § 2C:7-2c (2002). A convicted sex offender must also re-register with the
appropriate agency within 10 days of moving to a new address. N.J. STAT. § 2C:7-2d (2002).
46. N.J. STAT. § 2C:7-2f (2002). An exception to this termination is found where the
individual has been convicted, adjudicated delinquent, or acquitted by reason of insanity for
more than one sex offense as defined under the statutes. N.J. STAT. § 2C:7-2g (2002).
47. Jerry Gray, Sex Offender Legislation Passes in the Senate, N.Y. TIMES, October 4,
1994, at B6.
48. See N.J. STAT. § 2C:7-8 (2002). This portion of the statute sets forth three levels of
notification which are dependent upon the risk of "re-offense." Id. Where the risk is low,
law enforcement in the area is notified. Id. If the risk is thought to be moderate, then
organizations, such as schools and youth groups, are to be notified. Id. Finally, if the risk
is determined to be high, the public is to be notified. Id.
49. Sullivan, supra note 43. At the time that New Jersey's statutes were passed, Cali-
fornia, Illinois, Arizona, New Hampshire and Alaska had struck down similar statutes
requiring community notification. Id. Washington was the only state that had upheld the
requirement of community notification along with a registry of sex offenders. Id.
50. N.J. STAT. § 2C:7-19 (2002).
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B. Federal Legislation
At the time that Megan was murdered in 1994, the Federal
Omnibus Crime Bill was in the process of being passed by Con-
gress.51 One portion of that bill was the Jacob Wetterling Crimes
Against Children and Sex Offender Registration Act (hereinafter
the "Wetterling Act").52
Jacob Wetterling was an eleven-year old boy from St. Joseph,
Minnesota, who, like Megan, was tragically taken from his family
at a young age. 53 In October 1989, Jacob and his younger brother
were returning home from a local convenience store with a friend
when a man approached them and kidnapped Jacob at gunpoint.54
Jacob was never seen again, and his kidnapper was never cap-
tured. 5 In response to their personal tragedy, Jacob's parents,
much like Megan's parents would do a few years later, sought to
focus attention on the plight of missing children and established a
non-profit foundation to help meet this goal.56
While promoting the Federal Omnibus Crime Bill in 1996,
President Clinton made specific reference to the case involving
Megan Kanka and noted the need for a community notification
provision.57 On June 22, 1996, in his weekly radio address to the
nation, President Clinton made the following statement with re-
gard to Megan's Law:
Nothing is more important than keeping our children safe.
We have taken decisive steps to help families protect their
children, especially from sex offenders, people who according
to study after study are likely to commit their crimes again
and again. We've all read too many tragic stories about young
51. See Jacob Wetterling Foundation, History of the Jacob Wetterling Act, at
http://www.jwf.orgjwf_ jwact_history.html (last visited March 3, 2003). The legislation was
passed on September 13, 1994. See 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2002).
52. Jacob Wetterling Foundation, Jacob's Story, at http://www.jwf.org/jacobs-story.html
(last visited March 3, 2003). This legislation was subsequently codified at 42 U.S.C. §
14071. See also 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2002).
53. See Jacob Wetterling Foundation, Jacob's Story, at http://www.jwf.
org/jacobs-story.html (last visited March 3, 2003).
54. Id. Jacob's kidnapper ordered all three boys to lie down on the ground, however,
after asking each boy his age, he instructed Jacob's friend and brother to run into the
woods. Id. When the boys looked back, Jacob and the man had disappeared. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. The Jacob Wetterling Foundation was incorporated in February 1990 and its
stated goal is to "provide information and support to victim families throughout the com-
munity." Id.
57. Sullivan, supra note 43.
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people victimized by repeat offenders. That's why in the
crime bill we required every state in the country to compile a
registry of sex offenders, and gave states the power to notify
communities about child sex offenders and violent sex offend-
ers that move into their neighborhoods.
But that wasn't enough, and last month I signed Megan's law
[sic]. That insists that states tell a community whenever a
dangerous sexual predator enters its midst. Too many chil-
dren and their families have paid a terrible price because par-
ents didn't know about the dangers hidden in their own
neighborhood. Megan's law [sic], named after a seven-year-
old girl taken so wrongly at the beginning of her life, will help
to prevent more of these terrible crimes."
The Federal version of Megan's Law was incorporated into the
Wetterling Act and provides that "the designated State law en-
forcement agency . . .shall release relevant information that is
necessary to protect the public concerning a specific person re-
quired to register under this section ....
As part of the Megan's Law amendments to the Wetterling Act,
a portion of each state's federal funding was made contingent
upon their timely passage of similar laws. ° Under these provi-
sions, any state which had not enacted similar legislation within
three years of the amendment to the Wetterling Act would become
ineligible for 10 percent of the federal funds which would other-
wise have been allocated to that state under the Omnibus Crime
Bill.6' Accordingly, by 1996, every state and the District of Co-
lumbia had enacted a version of Megan's Law legislation.62
C. State Compliance with the Wetterling Act and its Megan's
Law Component
Following the amendment of the Wetterling Act by the federal
government, the individual states soon followed with their own
58. CNN, President Clinton's Weekly Radio Address - June 22, 1996, available at
http://www.cnn.com/US/9606/22/Clinton.radio/transcript.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2003).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 14071(d) (2002). See also Megan's Law, May 17, 1996, P.L. 104-145, § 2,
110 STAT. 1345 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14071).
60. See Pam Lychner Sexual Offender Tracking and Identification Act of 1996, Oct. 3
1996, P.L. 104-236, § 9, 110 Stat. 3098 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14071).
61. Id.
62. Id.
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versions of Megan's Law legislation.63 One initial problem faced
by the federal government regarding the newly established notifi-
cation guidelines was the creation of a system to monitor and as-
sist the states with compliance.' In order to achieve the goals of
Congress and assure compliance by the individual states, it
seemed that the federal government would need to take an active
role.
On February 2, 1997, Attorney General Janet Reno issued a
press release regarding Megan's Law and the Justice Depart-
ment's anticipated role in its application. 65 Attorney General Reno
noted that the federal government intended to work as partners
with the states, "providing guidance, information and resources,"
during the development of both notification programs and the in-
dividual state registry systems for sex offenders.66 In addition to
promising guidelines to the states to help them achieve compli-
ance, the Attorney General also made reference to the National
Sex Offender Registry that was being planned at President Clin-
ton's direction.
As promised, the Justice Department issued guidelines for the
states with regard to Megan's Law compliance on April 4, 1997.'
According to Attorney General Reno, these guidelines were meant
to "provide minimum national standards for states to follow in
developing community notification systems for sex offenders," and
furthermore, were intended to "ensure that members of the public
. . . [could] protect their families by obtaining information about
registered offenders." 9 The press release highlighted four main
points on which the guidelines focused: 1) states would be required
to release information about registered offenders to the public, not
just law enforcement; 2) states would not be permitted to release
information on a discretionary basis, but rather, would be re-
quired to release such information as necessary to protect the pub-
63. Id.
64. Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Justice Department Releases Megan's
Law Guidelines, #97-140, Apr. 7, 1997, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/1997/
April97/140vaw.htm. The guidelines eventually promulgated were meant to assist the
states with the implementation of Megan's Law by providing them with minimum stan-
dards. Id.
65. Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Statement of Attorney General Reno on








lic; 3) community notification would be applied to both child mo-
lesters and other sex offenders; and 4) states would have the op-
tion of adopting an "affirmative" approach through actual notifica-
tion of neighbors or, in the alternative, by making sex offender
information available to the public at their request.0
Under the guidelines, states would also have the option to im-
pose registration on previously convicted offenders.7' Moreover,
the guidelines indicated that the Department of Justice had previ-
ously participated, and would continue to actively participate, in
any litigation to defend the validity of the community notification
requirements under the new law.72
In March 1998, the United States Department of Justice's Bu-
reau of Justice Statistics established the National Sex Offender
Registry Assistance Program.73 This program was intended to fur-
ther assist states in meeting the requirements of both the Wetter-
ling Act and Megan's Law, and also allowed states to participate
in the FBI's National Sex Offender Registry.74 In April 1998, a
project was initiated under the program to survey the states in
order to evaluate and track their compliance with the registry re-
quirements of the Wetterling Act and the federal version of
Megan's Law.7' The most recent survey, published in March
2002, highlighted the fact that as of February 2001, 366,000 con-
victed sex offenders were registered in the United States."
Since its enactment, another development has greatly impacted
Megan's Law and the dissemination of information regarding con-
victed sex offenders to communities in which they reside: the
70. Id. See also Final Guidelines for Megan's Law and the Jacob Wetterling Crimes
Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, 62 Fed. Reg. 39009 (filed
July 21, 1997).
71. U.S. Department of Justice, supra note 64.
72. Id. The federal government has, in fact, kept its promise to the states by filing
amicus briefs in cases filed in New Jersey, Washington, Connecticut and New York. See
Dena T. Sacco, Arguments Used to Challenge Notification Laws - and the Government's
Response, National Conference on Sex Offender Registries, NCJ-168965, April 1998, avail-
able at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ncsor.pdf.
73. Devon B. Adams, Summary of State Sex Offender Registries, 2001, Bureau of Jus-
tice Statistics Fact Sheet, NCJ-192265, March 2002, available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/puh/pdf/sssor0l.pdf.
74. Id. The National Sex Offender Registry was created at the direction of President
Clinton. See U.S. Department of Justice, supra note 64.
75. Adams, supra note 73.
76. Id. This number was compared to the figures cited for April 1998 at which time
277,000 sex offenders were registered. Id.
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widespread use and availability of the Internet." In fact, the
Summary of State Sex Offender Registries indicates that as of
March 2002, 35 states and the District of Columbia were providing
access to sex offender registries via the Internet, with several
other states planning websites in the near future."8
IV. LEGAL CHALLENGES TO MEGAN'S LAW
A. Three Theories of Megan's Law Challenges
While the public has generally embraced Megan's Law and its
goals, this legislation has not been without opposition, primarily
from those convicted sex offenders to whom it applies." Almost
immediately after its enactment, challenges to Megan's Law began
to arise in both state and federal courts and a pattern involving
three dominant areas of Constitutional law emerged - the issues
of punishment, privacy and due process."
1. The Question of Punishment
The issue of punishment has been described as the most fre-
quent Constitutional challenge to Megan's Law legislation.81 Chal-
lenges in this area, typically brought as ex post facto and double
jeopardy claims, have focused on a variety of arguments which
suggest that Megan's Law punishes sex offenders that are re-
quired to register in that it subjects them to the possibility of pub-
lic ridicule, ostracism, job discrimination, housing discrimination,
and other forms of ongoing punishment.82 With regard to these
specific claims, Sections 9 and 10 of Article I of the United States
Constitution prohibit both state and federal government from
passing "ex post facto laws," legislation that retroactively alters
the criminal law.83 Likewise, under the theory of double jeopardy,
77. See Julia Sommerfield, Megan's Law Expands to the Internet, August 17, 1999, at
http://www.msnbc.com/news/297969.asp (last visited April 20, 2003).
78. Id. While access is available by Internet in most states, it should be noted that
some states have set forth requirements which limit access to the information to those in
particular communities and/or may assess a fee. Id. Furthermore, several states maintain
lists which track the individuals who request access to the registry. Id. See also Adams,
supra note 73.




83. U.S. CONST. Art. I, §§ 9, 10.
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the Constitution also prohibits prosecuting a defendant twice for
the same crime.'
Opponents of these claims, typically state and federal govern-
ment, argue that Megan's Law, particularly with regard to notifi-
cation requirements, is intended to protect the public, not punish
sex offenders. 5 These opponents also argue that most of the in-
formation regarding sex offenders is already a matter of public
record due to legal proceedings which are a direct result of their
crimes.86
2. The Right to Privacy
Many sex offenders also attempt to argue that community noti-
fication laws violate their right to privacy by revealing personal
information to the public at large. 7 In response, opponents sug-
gest that there is no "privacy interest in the type of information
States disseminate under notification laws, because it is public
record information already exposed to public view."" In further
support of this position, it is suggested that a "balancing test"
would be applied to settle these types of disputes and as such, the
public interest and the safety of potential victims would most
likely outweigh a sex offender's right to anonymity. 9
3. Due Process Considerations
The final area which is often raised to challenge Megan's Law
legislation involves considerations of due process. The Constitu-
tion prohibits government from depriving a person of "life, liberty
or property," without due process of law.9 ° Several of the sex of-
fenders who have challenged Megan's Law have argued that
community notification laws deprive them of their liberty and
therefore, should not be imposed without "extensive, trial-like pro-
cedures."9' The defenders of Megan's Law generally argue that the
mere labeling of a person as a criminal or statements regarding
84. U.S. CONST. amend. V.





90. U.S. CONST. amend. V and amend. XIV, § 1. There are two clauses in the Constitu-
tion which deal with due process: the Fifth Amendment, which applies to the federal gov-
ernment, and the Fourteenth Amendment, which is applied to the states. See id.
91. Sacco, supra note 72.
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crimes committed by that person do not infringe on Constitutional
rights.92
B. Case Law Decisions Regarding Megan's Law
1. New Jersey's First Challenge to Megan's Law
One of the first cases to address the constitutionality of Megan's
Law and the community notification requirement it imposes was
Doe v. Poritz, decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court in 1995."3
In Doe, the plaintiff sought an injunction against application of
the registration and notification laws, alleging that their applica-
tion would constitute punishment, invasion of privacy, and violate
procedural due process.94 The plaintiff contended that he was a
first-time offender who had successfully completed treatment, that
he had been paroled and had been living and working within a
community for some time, and furthermore, offered proof that
should his conviction be subject to community notification, he
would lose his job.95
The court first addressed the challenges on the basis of punish-
ment. Following a review of the relevant case law, the court con-
cluded that "a statute that can fairly be characterized as remedial,
both in its purpose and implementing provision, does not consti-
tute punishment even though its remedial provisions have some
inevitable deterrent impact." 9 The court went on to state that
absent an intent to punish, a law does not become punitive simply
because of its impact.97 The court also looked to the legislative
history regarding New Jersey's Megan's Law to determine the in-
tent of the legislature relating to punishment of sex offenders.98
The court found that the law was "clearly and totally remedial in
92. Id.
93. Doe, 662 A.2d 367 (N.J. 1995). "Doe," using a fictitious name, brought suit indi-
vidually and on behalf of all others similarly situated. Id.
94. Id. at 380. The New Jersey statutes at issue in this case are discussed in Section
III.A. of this comment and its accompanying notes.
95. Id. It is interesting to note that the plaintiff in this case was treated at the Avenal
Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center, the same facility where Jesse Timmendequas had
received treatment and counseling following his 1981 conviction for sex offenses against
two small children. See Court TV Casefiles, supra note 4; CNN Interactive, supra note 11.
96. Doe, 662 A.2d at 388.
97. Id. at 387-88. The Court noted that their discussion of the law in this area would
have to focus on federal cases, despite the fact that plaintiff based his constitutional chal-
lenges on both the federal and New Jersey Constitutions, because New Jersey had no rele-
vant case law in this area. Id. at 388.
98. Id. at 404.
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purpose," and that preventing danger to a community is a legiti-
mate regulatory goal.99
The plaintiffs challenge to Megan's Law on the basis of a right
to privacy was next addressed. The Court determined that the
Fourteenth Amendment protected at least two different privacy
interests: confidentiality and autonomy. °0 The Court first exam-
ined plaintiffs expectation of privacy with regard to the informa-
tion that would be disclosed under the registration aspect of
Megan's Law and determined that when such information is read-
ily available to the public or exposed to public view, there is no
constitutional protection. 01 Despite this view, the court did admit
concerns regarding the revelation of the plaintiffs home address,
noting that it should be clear that both the registration and notifi-
cation laws were to be used "as a means of protection, not as a
means of harassment."10 2 In order to resolve the perceived conflict
between the right to private information and the individual's right
to confidentiality, the court adopted a balancing test and found
that the state's interest in protecting the public was both legiti-
mate and substantial and therefore, no violation to the right of
privacy existed.' 3
With regard to plaintiffs due process challenge, the court ex-
plained that its analysis would first assess whether a liberty in-
terest had been interfered with by the State, and second, whether
the attending procedures were constitutionally sufficient.' 4 The
court determined that the registration and notification laws did
trigger due process because they affected the plaintiffs liberty in-
terests in both privacy and reputation. 0 In seeking to meet the
requirements of due process, the court noted that, at a minimum,
the plaintiff would need to be afforded notice and the opportunity
to be heard.0 6 As such, the court held that upon application, judi-
cial review should be applied prior to release of information.07
In conclusion, the court specifically noted that it was "sail[ing]
on truly uncharted waters," as no other states had yet adopted
99. Id.
100. Doe, 662 A.2d at 406.
101. Id. at 407. The Court also pointed to the fact that New Jersey specifically guaran-
tees public access to criminal court records in support of their position. Id.
102. Id. at 409.
103. Id. at 411-12.
104. Id. at 417.
105. Doe, 662 A.2d at 420.
106. Id. at 422.
107. Id. at 423.
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such far-reaching statutes.10 8 While noting that judicial review
would be available upon application with regard to the due process
challenges, the plaintiffs other constitutional challenges were ul-
timately rejected.'0 9 With regard to New Jersey's Megan's Law, the
court opined that it was both rational and careful in addressing a
"pressing societal problem," and that it was not what the drafters
envisioned as an abuse of the government's power to punish."'
2. Recent Decisions in the United States Supreme Court
Applying counter-arguments similar to those employed in Doe v.
Poritz, the United States Supreme Court has recently decided two
cases involving challenges to Megan's Law."' The first of these
cases, Connecticut Department of Safety v. Doe, questioned
whether Connecticut's sex offender registry deprived registered
sex offenders of a liberty interest in violation of the due process
clause."2 The latter, Smith v. Doe, questioned whether the regis-
tration requirement set forth by the state of Alaska was a retroac-
tive punishment in violation of the ex post facto clause."3 As will
be discussed below, in each of these cases, Megan's Law was up-
held by the Supreme Court, despite assertions of implied viola-
tions of constitutional rights.
a. Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe
Connecticut's Megan's Law provides that all convicted sex of-
fenders must register with the Department of Public Safety
("DPS") by providing personal information, including their name,
address, photograph and a DNA sample for a period of 10 years, or
for life in the case of a sexually violent offense."4 The respondent
in this matter, "John Doe," was a convicted sex offender who was
subject to the registration requirements of Connecticut's Megan's
Law."' Prior to the filing of the underlying lawsuit, the state op-
108. Id. at 422.
109. Id. at 423.
110. Doe, 662 A-2d at 422-23.
111. Connecticut Dep't of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003); Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S.
84(2003).
112. Connecticut Dep't of Public Safety, 538 U.S. at 3-4.
113. Smith, 538 U.S. at 89.
114. Connecticut Dep't of Public Safety, 538 U.S. at 4-5.
115. Id. at 5-6.
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erated an Internet website which allowed the public to access in-
formation on sex offenders by entering a zip code or town name.1 6
The District Court granted summary judgment on plaintiffs due
process claim, certified a class of persons similarly situated to Doe,
and permanently enjoined Connecticut's public disclosure provi-
sions, which resulted in the shutdown of the DPS website regard-
ing sex offenders. " The Second Circuit affirmed the decision,
finding that the due process clause of the United States Constitu-
tion entitles class members to a hearing before information is dis-
seminated to the public.11 8 Despite a disclaimer on the website
that indicated DPS had made no determinations as to whether
individuals were currently dangerous, the Court of Appeals also
found that because the law implied that the offender was danger-
ous, a "liberty interest" was implicated."9 Furthermore, the court
expressed the opinion that the registration requirements were
"extensive and onerous."120
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and heard
oral arguments in November 2002.121 In an opinion delivered by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court referred to its 1976 decision in
Paul v. Davis,122 and reiterated that "mere injury to reputation,
even if defamatory, does not constitute the deprivation of a liberty
interest."23 Justice Rehnquist went on to state that the fact that
the plaintiff was seeking to prove that he currently does not pre-
sent a danger to society was inconsequential. '24 The opinion
stresses the fact that all sex offenders must be publicly disclosed
and, barring demonstration by the plaintiff that the substantive
rule of law is defective due to a constitutional conflict, a hearing
would be useless.121 The Court concluded that because the ques-
tion was argued as one of procedural due process, the issue was
116. Id. at 5.
117. Doe v. Connecticut Dep't of Public Safety, 271 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 2001).
118. Associated Press, supra note 5.
119. Doe, 271 F.3d at 57-60.
120. Connecticut Dep't of Public Safety, 538 U.S. at 6.
121. Id.; see also Associated Press, supra note 5.
122. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
123. Connecticut Dep't of Public Safety, 538 U.S. at 6-7. Chief Justice Rehnquist was
joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg and Breyer. Id. at
2. Justice Souter wrote a concurring opinion, in which Justice Ginsburg joined, while Jus-
tice Stevens filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Id.




not properly before the Court, and the opinion would not address
the question of whether substantive due process was violated.'26
Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion, stated that even if Con-
necticut's law implicated a liberty interest, he would not find that
the plaintiff was entitled to a hearing under a substantive due
process argument."7 Using the requirement that a licensed driver
must be 16 years of age as an analogy, Justice Scalia stated that
"a convicted sex offender has no more right to additional 'process'
enabling him to establish that he is not dangerous than ... a 15-
year-old has a right to 'process' enabling him to establish that he
is a safe driver."
28
b. Smith v. Doe
In a companion case to Connecticut Department of Public Safety
v. Doe, the Supreme Court also delivered its opinion in Smith v.
Doe I on March 5, 2003.129 This opinion, authored by Justice Ken-
nedy, addressed the question of whether Alaska's version of
Megan's Law was a retroactive punishment prohibited by the ex
post facto clause of the United States Constitution.3 '
Like many other state versions of Megan's Law, Alaska's law is
comprised of two retroactive components: a registration require-
ment and a notification provision.131 In addition to providing
name, aliases, identifying features, address, place of employment,
date of birth, conviction information, driver's license number, in-
formation about vehicles to which they have access, and post-
conviction treatment history, under Alaska's version of Megan's
Law, a convicted sex offender must also submit to fingerprinting
126. Id. at 8.
127. Id. at 8-9 (Scalia, J., concurring).
128. Connecticut Dep't of Public Safety, 538 U.S. at 8-9 (Scalia, J., concurring).
129. Smith, 538 U.S. 84. The original plaintiffs to this action included John Doe I, who
had been accused of sexually abusing his daughter, his wife, Jane Doe, and John Doe II,
who pled nolo contendere to sexual abuse of a 14-year-old. Id. at 9. Both Doe I and Doe II
were convicted of sexual offenses against minors and were released from prison in 1990,
following completion of a rehabilitative program. Id. Despite the fact that both were con-
victed before Alaska enacted its version of Megan's Law, they were still deemed to be cov-
ered by it and were required to register. Id.
130. Id. at 89. Although this ultimately represents a 6-3 decision, it does not appear to
have been without controversy. Justice Kennedy was joined by Justices Rehnquist,
O'Connor, Scalia and Thomas. Id. at 88. In addition, Justice Thomas wrote separately. Id.
Justice Souter wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment. Id. Justice Stevens filed a
dissent, as did Justice Ginsburg, who was joined by Justice Breyer. Id.
131. Id. at 90.
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and photographing." Although some information is kept confi-
dential, Alaska, like Connecticut, has elected to utilize the Inter-
net to publish that information which is not held confidential.
133
In order to evaluate the statute at issue, the Court stated that it
had to determine whether the intention of the legislature was to
impose punishment." If such an intent was found, the inquiry
would necessarily end. However, even if the statute was found to
be "civil and nonpunitive," the Court would still need to determine
whether the statutory scheme was "so punitive either in purpose
or effect as to negate [the state's] intention to deem it civil." 135 De-
spite the fact that Alaska's statute was partially codified in the
state's criminal procedure code, the Court determined, as did the
District Court and the Court of Appeals before them, that the
Alaska legislature intended "to create a civil, nonpunitive re-
,,136gime.
The opinion then moved on to evaluate the effects of the Alaska
statute and, in doing so, looked to the 1963 case of Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez137 for guidance.'38  In Mendoza-Martinez, the
Court had set forth seven factors which provided the current
Court with "useful guideposts" for evaluating ex post facto claims,
despite the fact that they were "neither exhaustive nor disposi-
tive."19 Among the factors identified by the Court as potentially
relevant to their analysis were questions as to whether the regula-
tory scheme "has been regarded in our history and traditions as a
punishment; imposes an affirmative disability or restraint; pro-
motes the traditional aims of punishment; has a rational connec-
tion to a nonpunitive purpose; or is excessive with respect to this
purpose.""'o
132. Id.
133. Id. at 90-91. The information made available to the public via the Internet includes
.name, aliases, photograph, description, description and license information of motor vehi-
cles, place of employment, crime for which convicted, date of conviction, place and court of
conviction, length and conditions of sentence, and a statement as to whether the offender
... is in compliance.., or cannot be located." Id.
134. Smith, 538 U.S. at 92.
135. Id. (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997)).
136. Id. at 92-95. The respondents, apparently seeking to "cast doubt" on the non-
punitive intent of the Act, had pointed to language in Alaska's Constitution which identi-
fied protection of the public as one of the purposes of criminal administration. Id. at 93.
The Court stated in response to this argument that "[t]he location and labels of a statutory
provision do not by themselves transform a civil remedy into a criminal one." Id. at 94.
137. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
138. Id. at 1149.
139. Smith, 538 U.S. at 97 (citations omitted).
140. Id.
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Using this framework to assess the nature of the Act with re-
gard to punishment, the Court began its analysis by looking at
whether the Act had been regarded historically as punishment.
14
Respondents contended that the Act, particularly the notification
requirement, resembled "shaming punishments" of the colonial
period. 142 Respondents pointed to colonial punishments in which
offenders were required to stand before the public with a sign
identifying their crime as well as incidents where serious offend-
ers were banished from their community.4 1 In doing so, the Re-
spondents were attempting to argue that Alaska's compulsory reg-
istration and notification requirements had a similar effect.
44
In response to these contentions, the Court stated that respon-
dents arguments were misleading, and rationalized that the
"stigma" that results from Alaska's Megan's Law "results not from
public display for ridicule and shaming but from the dissemina-
tion of accurate information about a criminal record, most of
which is already public." '4' The Court went on to note that the
global reach of the Internet does not render the notification proce-
dure punitive where the purpose and effect of notification is public
safety.' 41 Moreover, the Court found that such widespread access
is necessary and that the "attendant humiliation is but a collateral
consequence of a valid regulation."147
The Court then considered the question of whether the Act im-
posed an affirmative disability or restraint on the respondents.'
At the outset, the Court noted that the Act imposed no physical
restraints on sex offenders which would resemble actual impris-
onment, nor did it restrain registrants from freely changing jobs
or residences. 149  The respondents had argued that the Act was
"likely to make [them] completely unemployable" as employers
would not want to risk losing business because of the stigma."0
The Court determined that this was pure conjecture and pointed
to the fact that only one incident of "community hostility" against
a registered sex offender had occurred in the seven years since
141. Id.
142. Id. at 97-98.
143. Id. at 98.
144. Id.
145. Smith, 538 U.S. at 98.
146. Id. at 99.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 99-100.
149. Id. at 100.
150. Id.
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Alaska's Megan's Law had gone into effect."' The Court went on
to add that due to public knowledge of the crime committed by this
individual, this could have occurred despite the Act.
152
The Court was also unimpressed by argument which suggested
that requiring offenders to periodically update their information
constituted an affirmative disability, and in response, pointed out
that updates were not required to be made in person.153 The Ninth
Circuit had been persuaded that the registration requirement was
"parallel" to probation and supervised release in that it imposed a
restraint on sex offenders.' While acknowledging that this ar-
gument had "some force," the Court ultimately rejected it, finding
that these individuals were still free to move, live and work as
they wished, without supervision.'55
The Court also determined that the Ninth Circuit had erred by
concluding that the registration requirements were retributive
due to the fact that the Act was applied to all convicted sex offend-
ers, without regard to future danger, and also because it failed to
limit the number of persons with access to the information. 156 In
support of their position, the Court pointed to high rates of recidi-
vism in cases of sex offenders and to the fact that most "reof-
fenses" do not occur within the first few years, "but may occur as
late as 20 years following release."'57 With regard to the Ninth
Circuit's position that access to information was unlimited, the
Court believed it significant that the notification system at issue
was a "passive" one that required interested parties to seek access
to the information.58
Based upon their analysis and the respondents failure to dem-
onstrate that the Act was in fact a civil regulatory scheme, the
Court determined that Alaska's Megan's Law was nonpunitive,
and that its retroactive application to the respondents, and others
151. Smith, 538 U.S. at 100. See also Doe v. Otte, 259 F.3d 979, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2001).
The Ninth Circuit referred to an incident in which one registered sex offender suffered
community hostility and damage to his business after print-outs from the Internet site
were distributed and posted on bulletin boards. Id.
152. Smith, 538 U.S. at 100.
153. Id. at 101.
154. Id. See also Otte, 259 F.3d at 987.
155. Smith, 538 U.S. at 101.
156. Id. at 102.
157. Id. at 103-04 (citation omitted).
158. Id. at 104-05. In addition, the Court felt that the warning that was displayed when
the system was accessed was also significant in that it stated that individuals who used the
system to commit criminal acts against others would be subjected to criminal prosecution.
Id. at 105.
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similarly situated, did not violate the ex post facto clause of the
United States Constitution.15 9 The Court subsequently reversed
the judgment of the Ninth Circuit.
160
V. CONCLUSION
Since Megan Kanka's death in 1994, federal and state versions
of the law which bears her name have been challenged; however,
it appears, at least for now, that Megan's Law has survived those
challenges and will continue to remain in effect. Despite this fact,
the United States Supreme Court has seemingly left the door open
with regard to attacks on Megan's Law alleging violation of sub-
stantive due process and equal protection.
As Justice Scalia has noted, a challenge to substantive due
process will require its proponent to establish that Megan's Law
implicates a fundamental right. 61 Similarly, as noted by Justice
Souter, not only does the possibility exist that Megan's Law will
be challenged on a substantive due process ground, but it is also
clear that an equal protection argument may be on the horizon.'62
Maureen Kanka stated after Megan's death: "If we had been
aware of [Timmendequas'] record, my daughter would be alive
today."'63 While the future of Megan's Law is somewhat uncertain,
what is clear at this time is that both the state and federal enact-
ments, and the accompanying notification requirements, have
brought issues of child safety and protection into the forefront. It
is equally clear that the purpose of this legislation, the protection
of children, is thought by many to be of a compelling nature, but
159. Smith, 538 U.S. at 105-06.
160. Id. at 106.
161. See Connecticut Dep't of Public Safety, 538 U.S. at 8-9 (Scalia, J., concurring). An
attack on Megan's Law alleging violation of a fundamental right will trigger strict scrutiny,
thereby requiring the government to show that the law is necessary to achieve a compelling
or overriding government purpose. Barron, Jerome A. & C. Thomas Dienes,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 188-92 (4th ed. 1999).
162. Id. at 1165-66 (Souter, J., concurring). With regard to both issues, Justice Souter
stated: "Today's case is no occasion to speak either to the possible merits of such a chal-
lenge or the standard of scrutiny that might be in order when considering it. I merely note
that the Court's rejection of respondents' procedural due process claim does not immunize
publication schemes like Connecticut's from an equal protection challenge." Id. at 1166.
163. Mission Statement of the Megan Nicole Kanka Foundation, at
http://www.megannicolekanka foundation.org/mission.htm (last visited on March 11, 2003).
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whether the Supreme Court ultimately agrees, we will have to
wait and see.
Maureen S. Hopbell*

